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In November 1984, Richard Stephenson was murdered in East St. Louis, Illinois. There were no suspects in the
homicide until March 1986, when Donald Charlton, an inmate of the Graham
Correctional Facility, informed the police that he had pertinent information
regarding the crime. A fellow inmate of
Charlton's, Uoyd Perkins, had told him
the details of a murder he committed in
East St. Louis.
Acting on Charlton's detailed account,
which the police found to be credible,
police traced Perkins to a jail in Montgomery County, Illinois, where he was
awaiting trial on an unrelated charge. In
order to further investigate Perkins' relation to the murder, police placed
undercover agent,John Parisi, and Charlton in a cellblock with Perkins. The two
men were instructed to engage Perkins
in casual conversation and report any
reference made to the Stephenson
murder. Parisi and Charlton gained Perkins' confidence by promising a fabricated escape plot. In that murder could
have been necessary to effectuate such a
plot, Parisi inquired whether Perkins
had ever murdered anyone before. Perkins responded by relaying the details of
how he murdered Stephenson. At no
time was Perkins given Miranda warnings, and Perkins was subsequently
charged with the Stephenson murder.
At trial, Perkins moved to suppress his
statements made to Parisi while in jail.
The trial court granted the motion; the
State appealed. In affirming, the appellate court held that Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), "prohibits all
undercover contacts with incarcerated
suspects which are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response." Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2396. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine
whether Miranda warnings must be
given under such circumstances, and
reversed.
In an opinion delivered by Justice
Kennedy, the Supreme Court first cited
the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, which prohibits the
admission into evidence of statements
made during custodial interrogation,
absent Miranda warnings. Custodial
interrogation involves the questioning
of a suspect in a coercive, policedominated atmosphere. [d. at 2397. The
Court found that the doctrine was in38-The Law Forum/21.1

tended to safeguard suspects from the
"inherently compelling pressures which
work to undermine the individual's will
to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would not otherwise do so
freely." [d. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 467).
The Court, however, distinguished
Perkins from the concerns underlying
Miranda. The problem of compulsion
inherent in a police-dominated atmosphere, the Court reasoned, is not present when an incarcerated suspect speaks
voluntarily to an undercover
agent. "Coercion is determined from
the perspective of the suspect." [d. (citations omitted). Thus, the coercive
atmosphere is absent where a suspect
speaks voluntarily to a fellow inmate,
unaware that the inmate is a police
officer. [d.
Moreover, the Court rejected the state
court's assumption that whenever a suspect is in technical custody, Miranda
warnings must precede any conversation with an undercover agent. [d. The
Court reasoned that a suspect, unaware
that he is speaking with an undercover
agent, is neither motivated by pressure
nor the reaction he expects from his
listener. [d. at 2398. Miranda, the Court
stated, was not intended to protect statements motivated entirely by a suspect's
desire to impress other inmates. When
inmates boast to fellow inmates of their
crimes, they do so at their own risk. Only
when a suspect is under coercive pressure to do so, must Miranda warnings
be given. [d.
In addressing the ploy used to elicit
Perkins' statements, the Court found
that" strategic deception" did not rise to
the level of coercion and, was therefore
not violative of the Self-Incrimination
Clause. [d. (citations omitted). Relying
_primarily on HOffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 ( 1966), the Court reiterated its
approval of the use of deceptive tactics.
Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2398. In Hoffa,
incriminating statements made by the
petitioner to a police informant who
fooled him into believing that he was a
colleague, were held admissible, in that
they did not result from coercion. The
only factual distinction between the
cases, the Court noted, was that Perkins
was incarcerated, a fact the Court considered irrelevant. [d.
In addition, the Court distinguished

ated suspect made incriminating statements to an Internal Revenue Service
agent absent Miranda warnings. [d. In
Matbis, the suspect's statements were
found to be inadmissible. However, in
Matbis, the Court noted, the suspect
was fully aware that the agent was a
government official and was therefore
susceptible to coercive pressure to
answer questions. Perkins, on the other
hand, was unaware of the undercover
agent's official status. [d.
Finally, the Court rejected the respondent's argument that a bright-line
rule for applying Miranda was desirable.
[d. at 2389. The Court reasoned that law
enforcement officials would have no
problem implementing the holding that
undercover agents need not Mirandize
incarcerated suspects. [d. The holding
clearly stated that Miranda concerns
were not present in such cases, and
therefore, Miranda warnings were not
required under such circumstances.
Finding no Miranda concerns implicated when an undercover agent speaks
with an incarcerated suspect, the Court
held that Miranda warnings need not be
given. The Court found arguments
against the use of such deceptive techniques and in favor ofMiranda warnings
in all custodial situations to be unpersuasive. Thus, the use of undercover
agents to elicit incriminating information from suspects was ruled to be
a valid law-enforcement technique.
- Tena Touzos

Cruzan v. Missouri Department of
Health: MISSOURI MAY REQUIRE
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF A PATIENT'S WISHES
TO DISCONTINUE FOOD AND
WATER
In Cruzan v. MissouriDep'tofHealtb,
110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990), the Supreme
Court held that a state may apply a clear
and convincing evidence standard in
proceedings where a guardian seeks to
discontinue nutrition and hydration of a
person in a persistent vegetative state.
Thus, unless the patient expressed his
wishes sufficiently to meet
this standard before incompetency, he
would remain in a vegetative state indefinitely, regardless of the objections and
wishes of family members.

Nancy Cruzan was rendered incompetent by injuries sustained in an automobile accident. After the accident she
remained in a Missouri state hospital in a
persistent vegetative state, where the
State of Missouri bore the cost of her
care. Nancy's parents sought a court
order for the withdrawal of their daughter's artificial feeding and hydration
equipment, as it was apparent that she
had virtually no chance of recovering.
The trial court found that an incompetent person had the right to refuse
"death-prolonging procedures," but the
Court did not adopt the clear and convincing evidence standard. Id. at 2846.
Thus, the Court issued the order based
on a conversation between Nancy and
her housemate in which Nancy stated
that if sick or injured she would not wish
to continue her life unless she could live
at least halfway normally. Id
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and held that because no clear
and convincing evidence existed as to
Nancy's intentions specifically regarding refusal offood and fluids, her parents
could not refuse the treatment for her.
Id. It also decided that the Missouri LivingWiU statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 459.010
et. seq. ( 1986), embodied a state policy
strongly favoring the preservation of life.
Id. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Nancy had a
constitutional right to require the hospital to withdraw her treatment under
these circumstances.
The Court began by recognizing a
person's right to refuse treatment based
on the common law doctrine of informed consent. It stated that the dispensing of medical treatment first required a patient's informed consent embodied in the notion of bodily integrity.
Id. at 2846-47. The right to privacy,
which was the foundation of a similar
case, In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 38-42
355 A.2d 647 (1976), was also examined as a basis for terminating treatment.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2847.
In Quinlan, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey granted the parents' request
to disconnect their incompetent daughter's respirator based on the daughter's
constitutional right to privacy. The court
concluded that the only practical way to
preserve the incompetent patient's privacy right was to allow her family to
decide whether she would exercise it in
these circumstances. The U.S. Supreme

Court, however, pointed out that after
Quinlan, most courts based a patient's

Id. Missouri also properly sought to

secure the deeply personal nature of
choosing between life and death. Id. at
2842-53. The Court cautioned, however, that not all incompetents will have
available surrogates, and where family
members are present, some will not act
to protect the patient.ld. at 2853. The
Court thus allowed Missouri to advance
these interests through the adoption of
the heightened evidentiary requirement.
Id In addition, the Court asserted that a
state may decline to make judgments
about the quality of an individual's life
and simply assert an unqualified interest
in the preservation of life to be weighed
against the constitutionally protected
interests of the individual.ld.
The Court determined that Missouri
correctly sought to advance these interests through the adoption of a clear and
convincing standard of proof in this
situation. It noted that the greater the
consequences of an erroneous decision,
the more stringent the burden of proof
should be. Id at 2854. The Court thus
held that Missouri properly placed that
increased burden on those seeking to
terminate an incompetent's life-sustaining treatment in that the decision to
withdraw treatment is irreversible.
After finding that the Missouri Supreme Court had properly concluded
that the evidence at trial did not meet
the required standard ofproof, the Court
ruled that the Due Process Clause did
not require a state to accept the" substituted judgment" of close fami1ymembers
in its absence. Id. at 2855-56. Based
upon the same reasons that it may
require a heightened procedural standard, a state may choose to defer to a
patient's wishes rather than confide the
decision to close family members.ld. at
2856.
Justice O'Connor concurred that a
person has a liberty interest in refusing
artificially delivered food and water. She
was concerned, however, in that the
majority's decision does not preclude a
future determination that the Constitution requires the states to accept the
decisions of a patient's duly-appointed
surrogate. She stated that such acceptance may be required because of its
practicality and the desire to honor a
patient's intent.ld. at 2857 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). She concluded that the
procedures for safeguarding incompetents' liberty interests are entrusted to
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right to refuse treatment either solely on
the common law right to informed con·
sent or on both the common law right
and the right to privacy. Id.
The Cruzan Court also inferred from
its prior decisions that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment. It previously held in
Washington v. Harper, that "[t]he forcible injection of medication into a nonconsenting person's body represent [ed1
a substantial interference with that person's liberty," Cruzan 110 S. Ct. at 2851
(quoting Washington 110 S. Ct. 1028,
1033 (1990». The Court state that determining that a person has a Due Process
"liberty interest" did not end the inquiry,
but that the liberty interest must be balanced against the relevant state interests.ld. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 u.s. 307, 321 (1982».
The Court assumed for the purposes
of this case that the Constitution grants a
competent person the right to refuse
lifesaving hydration and nutrition. Based
upon this assumption, the Court addressed the Cruzan's claim that an incompetent person possesses the same
right. The Court noted, however, that an
incompetent person cannot make an
informed and voluntary choice without
the help of some sort of"surrogate." Id.
at 2852.
The Court acknowledged Missouri's
reCOgnition of a surrogate to act for the
patient in electing to have life-sustaining
treatment withdrawn. It focused, however, on Missouri's establishment of the
procedural safeguard requiring proof by
clear and convincing evidence to assure
that the action of the surrogate con·
formed to the wishes expressed by the
patient while competent.ld. Thus, the
Court determined that the issue was
whether the United States Constitution
forbade the establishment of such a
requirement. Based upon the interest
the state sought to protect, the Court
found that the required heightened procedural standard was valid. Id.
Missouri's interest was the protection
and preservation of human life. The
Court supported this interest by recog·
nizing that states treat homicide as a
serious crime, and most impose criminal penalties for assisting with suicide.

the "laboratory" of the states. Id. at 2859
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia also concurred with the
Court's analysis but preferred that the
decision pronounce that the federal
courts have no business in this field. Id.
(Scalia, J., concurring). He noted that
American Law has always accorded the
state power to prevent suicide. He added
that the cause of death in suicide and
starvation is the suicidal person's conscious decision to "pu[t] an end to his
own existence." Id. at 2860 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (quoting 4 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries 189).
In a vigorous and lengthy dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall
and Justice Blackmun, opined that the
majority's opinion failed to respect the
best interests of the patients. He stated
that "the right to be free from unwanted
medical treatment [was] categorically
limited to those patients who had the
foresight to make an unambiguous statement of their wishes while competent."
Id. at 2879 (Brennan,]., dissenting).
Justice Stevens, dissenting, questioned
the majority's definition of "life" by suggesting that, for patients like Nancy,
there is a serious question as to whether
the mere persistence of their bodies is
"life." Id. at 2892 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He emphasized that "[t]he meaning and completion of her life should be
controlled by persons who have her best
interests at heart - not by a state legislature concerned only with the 'preservation oflife.'" Id. (Stevens,]., dissenting).
The Supreme Court recognized that a
"right to die" exists by virtue of the Due
Process Clause and mandated that it be
respected in states that have such legislation. Missouri properly chose to limit
this right by requiring clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes.
Other limits on the right to die are left to
the states to define in their own "laboratories." It would appear that the confusion over the right to die has just begun.
- Lesley A. Davis
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Peel v. Illinois: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT'S COMMERCIAL
SPEECH STANDARDS ALLOW
AN ATTORNEY TO ADVERTISE
HIS CERTIFICATION
In Peel v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2281
( 1990), the United States Supreme Court
held that an attorney had a constitutionally protected right, under the first
amendment's commercial speech standards, to advertise his certification as a
trial specialist. States are, thereby, prohibited from completely banning these
advertisements but may use less restrictive measures to regulate them.
In 1987, the Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois
("Commission") rued a complaint alleging that Gary Peel held himself out as a
certified legal specialist in violation of
the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility. Peel, 110 S. Ct. at 2285.
Rule 2-105(a)(3) of the Illinois Code
of Professional Responsibility provides
that" a lawyer or law firm may specify or
designate any area or field of law in
which he or its partners concentrates or
limits his or its practice... no lawyer may
hold himself out as 'certified' or a 'specialist.''' Id. at 2286. Peel's professional
letterhead included the notation "Certified Civil Trial Specialist by the National
Board ofTrial Advocacy" ("NBTA"), followed by the words "Licensed: Illinois,
Missouri, Arizona." Id. at 2285.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that
the letterhead was misleading in three
ways. First, on the letterhead, the certification was listed prior to the licensure,
and the court found that the public
could mistakenly construe that Peel's
authority to practice trial advocacy came
from the NBTA, thereby" impinging on
the exclusive authority" of the courts to
license attorneys. Id. at 2286. Second,
the NBTA certification implied that
Peel's legal services as a trial advocate
were superior to other attorneys' services, and thirdly, that NBTA certification
was a product of state licensure. Id. at
2287. Therefore, the Illinois Supreme
Court followed the Commission's recommendation and censured Peel. Id at
2286.
The Supreme Court found that NBTA
was a well recognized organization requiring exacting standards for certification. These standards included jury and
non-jury trial experience as lead counsel, successful completion of a day-long

examination, continuing legal education
requirements, and demonstrated writingability.Id. at 2284-85. The Court also
found that certification must be renewed
every five years and that several states,
including Minnesota and Alabama, recognized NBTA certification. Id
The Court next examined which standards should be used in determining
whether the State could regulate this
type of advertisement. The Supreme
Court agreed with the state court that
the standards for commercial speech
under the first amendment applied because Peel's letterhead was a "form of
commercial speech governed by the
'constitutional limitations on the regulation oflawyer advertising.'" Id. at 2287
(quoting In re Peel, 126 Ill.2d 397, 402,
534 N.E.2d 980, 982).
In the case ofInreR.M], 455 U.S. 191
(1982), the Court summarized these
standards as:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.
But when the particular content
or method of advertising suggests
that it is inherently misleading or
when experience has proved that
in fact such advertising is subject
to abuse, the States may impose
appropriate restrictions.
Peel, 110 S. Ct. at 2287. However, the
Court in In re R.M] also held that the
states may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially
misleading information. Id. (citing In re
R.M], 455 U.S. at 203.)
The Court then evaluated whether
the letterhead was misleading and
whether state censorship was justified.
The Court assumed that some consumers might infer from the sequential
listing of the certification that it exceeded the qualifications for admission
to a state bar. Id. at 2288. However,
since the NBTA's requirements were
verifiable factually, and not statements
of quality or opinion, they were not misleading. Id. In addition, the Court
emphasized that NBTA's certification
was like a trademark, in that, the quality
of the certification was recognized because of the organization granting it. Id.
The state court had argued that the
statements were misleading because consumers might identify the certification
as being issued by the state. The Supreme

